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The Inefficiency of Marginal—costPricing
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ABSTRACT
Under conditions of natural monopoly, private contractsor
government regulation may attempt to avoid inefficiency by
setting up a pricing formula. Once the capital stock is chosen,
the right price to charge the buyer is marginal cost. Butthe
point of this paper is that marginal—cost pricing provides the
wrong incentives + or the choice of the capital stock by the
seller.If the seller can achieve a high price bydeliberately
under—investing and driving up marginal cost, there will be a
systematic tendency toward too small a capital stock. Onetype
a-f contract or regulatory policy that avoids thisproblem charges
marginal cost to each buyer, but provides a revenue to theseller
that is equal to long—run unit cost, not short—runmarginal cost.
Such a contract or policy will make theprice, in the sense of
the revenue of the seller per unit of output,appear to be
unresponsive to market conditions.
Robert E. Hall
Herbert Hoover Memorial Building
Stanford University
Stanford, California 94305
(415) 497—2215Setting price equal to marginal cost can be inefficient.
Marginal cost prices provide the correct allocation of the output
from a fixed amount of capital, but may provide thewrong
incentives for capital accumulation.When a seller receives
marginal cost, it has an incentive to raise marginal cost by
investing too little.In cases of natural monopoly, certain
importanteconomicinstitutionshave arisentoprevent
inefficient exploitation of monopoly power. These institutions
involve long—term contracts or government regulation. Thispaper
shows that a contract or regulatory procedure grantinga seller a
price equal to its own marginal cost is inefficient.On the
other hand, marginal cost is the appropriate price tocharge
purchasers.
Contracts can circumvent the conflict between the needfor
efficient allocation of output among buyers, whichseems to call
for marginal—cost pricing, and the need for efficientinvestment,
which excludes marginal—cost pricing. The fully efficient
contract charges marginal cost to each purchaser, butprovides
stable revenue to the seller, so the seller cannotimprove profit
by deliberately creating a shortage 01-capacity.When demand is
strong and all customers are paying premium prices, theexcess
revenue is returned to the customers as lump—sum rebates, instead
of flowing to the firm.
1A wide variety of contracts of this type can bring both kinds
of efficiency——allocation of output and appropriate investment.
They all prevent the seller from profiting from a shortage of
capital, but otherwise do not limit the relation between output
and revenue.But I argue that one member at the class of fully
efficient contracts has some extra advantages and fits the facts
about output and revenue.Under this contract, revenue is
strictly proportional to output, or, to put it another way, the
"price," in the sense of revenue per Linit of output, is
predetermined by the contract (possibly it is indexed to observed
input costs). Price rigidity is a feature a-f the contract.
Earlier writers,notably Arthur Okun (1975,1981) have
commented upon the tendency for long—term relations to stabilize
unit revenue, but have invoked alternative principles to explain
the stability. Some oftheprinciples are outside the domain of
economics, and others, especially those relying on search and
in-formation, are yet to be fully developed.The principle
studied here is a straightforward economic one.
The sense in which prices are rigid in the model of this paper
has no direct Keynesian implications; that is, price rigidity
does not lead to disequilibrium in product markets. Efficient
allocationsof output do not admit an interpretation of
disequilibrium. In this respect, the arqument developed in this
paper parallels tne conclusion reached in the literature on labor
contracts (for citations, see Hall •1980).Contracts canstabilize wages without necessarilycreating an inefficient
allocation of labor.
In another respect, however, the argument of thispaper does
have important macroeconomic,and perhaps evenKeynesian,
implications.Prices are thought to be important signals about
the current state of the economy.For example, the performance
of labor contracts is much better if theycan be indexed to the
prices at which goods are actually bought and sold.But if
government price indexes report unit revenue, and unitrevenue is
stabilized for the reason laid out here, then thevalue of those
price indexes in contingent contracts is much reduced.
The inefficiency of marginal—costpricing is not completely
unknown in the literature on efficientregulation.In Alfred
Kahns two—volume treatise, The Economics ofRegulation (1970),
there are two long chapters on the virtuesof marginal—cost
pricing. In a single footnote Kahn notes theinvestment
disincentive (p. 106, note 52):
if public utility rates were free tofluctuate like purely competitive rates over the cycle, it
would in principle benecessary forregulatory
commissions to play a much more active role than they
now need to in the investment decisionprocess——
specifically, to compel companies to expandcapacity when necessary.Private managements would have a
strong temptation to delay capacityexpansion in
times of strong demand, hoping insteadto enjoy the
high profits resulting from the highprices required to ration customers.Kahn mentions earlier work of James Bonbright (1961), which
contains a brief statement of the point and cites Bruce Knight
(1930), as the originator.But Knights paper does not really
distinguish between the obvious problem of letting a monopoly
utility set its own price unilaterally and the more subtle
problem of a rule requiring price to equal marginal cost. In
Jacques Drezes review of the contributions of French applied
economists (1964), there is a brief discussion of the incentives
facing the firm subject to marginal—cost pricing, but it reaches
the incorrect conclusion that private and social optimality
coincide.Alan Walters' (1968) monograph on the economics of
publicroadsalso notes, briefly,tne problem ofthe
inappropriate incentives for investment under marginal cost
pricing, but all of his analysis deals with a public agency that
avoids the problem by adopting consumer surplus rather than
revenue as the positive item in its objective function.As far
as I can determine, the outpouring of work on peak load pricing
in the 1970s takes Walters' view and is completely silent on the
issue of investment incentives.
41. Evidence an price rigidity
Empirical studies for the United States are almostunanimous in
finding that fluctuations in prices and output are notmovements
along a marginal cost schedule. At the aggregatelevel, this was
the consensus of the Eckstein volume (1971) anda good deal of
later work in the same vein. In most a-f this work, the issue is
posed as one of finding demand effects in an equation withprice
as the left—hand variable and cost indexes as themajor right—
hand variables. The interpretation in terms ofmovements along a
marginal cost schedule is mine and not the original authors'.As
a rough guide, the elasticity of price withrespect to the
utilization rate (output—capital ratio) should beabout one—half
i-ftheelasticity of output with respect to variableinputs is
two—thirds.Though most studies find slightly positive demand
effects, they are never close to an elasticity ofa half.
Figure 1 presents data on prices relative to costsfor the
aggregate U.S. economy and Figure 2 does thesame for one key
industry producing a major intermediateproduct, steel. The
aggregate price is the implicit deflator for GNP in theNational
Income and Product Accounts and thecorresponding cost index is
the Bureau of Labor Statistics' inde>of compensation per
employee—hour. Both are expressed as indexes withtrends
removed.
The expansion of output from 1954 to 1955was accompanied by
a modest increase in prices relative tocosts.Then, as output
5Figure 1. Output and the pricecost ratiofor the U.S. economy
Sources:U.S. price is the implicit deflator for GNP, U.S.
National Income and Product Accounts.Cost is Bureau of Labor
Statistics, compensation per employee hour, private nonf arm
economy. Output is real GNP, U.S. NIPA.
Figure 2. Output and the price—cost ratio in the steel industry
Sources: Steel price is average realized U.S. producers prices
of cold—rolled carbon steel sheet, Table A—3. p. 159 in Crandall
(1981).Cost is U.S. production costs for cold—rolled sheet,
Table A—b, p. 172. Output is domestic shipments 0+ cold—rolled
sheet, Table A—2, p 158.
6fell to its troughs in 1958 and 1961, prices fell somewhat. When
output began its spectacular long rise from 1961 to 1966, prices
continued to decline relative to costs. The fall in output from
1969 to 1971 saw a small increase in the price—cost ratio. In
the later 1970s, the movement of prices is influenced by energy
costs, which are not considered here. Even so, there is no sign
of movement along an upward—sloping marginal cost schedule. In
1982, when output fell to its lowest point in the entire period,
prices continued to rise relative to costs.
Data for the steel industry are drawn from Robert Crandall 's
(1981) study of the economics of steel.Price is measured as
revenue divided by output for a single homogeneous product, cold—
rolled sheet.Cost is a detailed index of all components of
steel costs. Again, there is no systematic tendency for price to
rise relative to cost in booms or fall in periods of low output.
From 1956 to 1958, steel output fell by 23 percent, while price
rose a little relative to cost.From a trough in 1970 to a peak
in 1973, steel output rose by 44 percent, yet the price fell
significantly relative to cost.
These data strongly support the hypothesis that prices are
closely linked to factor costs and hardly linked to short—run
marginal cost at all.The rest of the paper investigates hy
contracts might have exactly this feature and yet provide the
efficient allocation of output and the efficient level of the
capital stock.
72. Contracts and allocational efficiency
As a general matter, I will be looking at a situation where one
producer sells output to N purchasers.The terms of the
transactionsare governed by N separatebilateral sales
contracts.Events occur in the following order:At contract
time, the terms are set. At investment time, the firm determines
the level o-fcapital to maximize expected profit under the
contract.At production time, the output is produced and
delivered to the purchasers.Buyer i 's need for the output is
perturbed by a random variable, Xj,whosevalue is not known at
all at contract time.At investment time, the producer has
imperfectinformation about the likely demand,butthis
information is not verifiable and the contract cannot be made
contingent on it.The advance information is described by a
scalar random variable, u. At production time, the buyers learn
their XjSbutagain, they cannot be verified by the seller.
The quantity delivered to purchaser i is q. The total delivered
to all purchasers is 0. Buyer i derives a benefit, V (qi ,x1)
from receiving qa.The producer incurs short—run variable costs
of C(Q,K,w) plus capital costs of rK.1< is the capital stock
chosen by the producer at investment time.The wage, w, and the
price of capital, r, become known after the contracts are signed
but before the capital decision is made.
For convenience,I introduce unnecessarily strong assumptions
8For convenience, I introduce unnecessarily strong assumptions
about V1 and C:
Assumptions: Each V1 (qa,xa)is strictly concave and
differentiable in q1..As a function of Q and K, C(Q,K,w) is
homogeneous of degree one, strictly convex, and continuously
differentiable.The derivative of V with respect toq1
becomes larae without limit as q1 approaches zero and
approaches zero as qa becomes large.The derivative of C
with respect to K becomes indefinitely negativeas K
approaches zero and approaches zero as K becomes large.
The goal of the parties is to set up a procedure to deliverthe
efficient quantity to each purchaser.The first concept of
efficiency used here is
Definition. An allocation ot output, q1,....q. is output—
efficient if it maximizes
C V1 (q1 ,x1) —C(Cq1,K,w
Note that output efficiency is a property of theallocation ex
post, after the demand shifts and factorprices become known.
The following obvious result will be usedextensively in the
sequel:
9Theorem 1. Thereexists a uniqueoutput—efficient
allocation! characterized by
cV C —
Thatis, whatever capital stock has been chosen by the producer,
the marginal benefit of output to each purchaser should equal
short—run marginal cost at that capital stock.
The second concept of efficiency is
Definition.K is capital—efficient i-f it maximizes
EEZ Va qt Xj— C(q,K,w) —rK]
where the expectation is over the distribution of Xi
conditionalon the in-formation available to the producer at
investment time, u, and the qa are the output—efficient
levels given K.
The parallel result for capital efficiency is:
Theorem 2.There is a unique efficient capital stock, and
it satisfies
E (—)r
The expected marginal reduction in cost associated with an
increase in the capital stock should equal the cost of capital.
10In order to achieve the efficientallocation, the parties agree
on a contract. A suitable class of contracts lets thebuyer pick
the value ofq1subject to making a payment to the seller in the
amount Rt (qa ,Q,K,w,r) . Thegeneral argument in favor of a
contract that has the buyer choose thequantity appears in Hall
and Lilien (1979) in the context of the labormarket and in
Weitzman (1981) in a setting like this one.8riefly, when one
party observes some private information and the otherparty is
affected by nothing but publicinformation, the first party
should make the active choice because itinternalizes the
influence o-ftheprivate information.
113. Contract provisions to provide the efficient capital stock
What is distinctive and complex about the setup considered in
this paper is the investment decision made by the producer after
contracts are signed.The total revenue from all its contracts
provides an investment incentive to the firm, and the contracts
must be designed to provide the right incentive in order to
achieve capital efficiency.
There is one minor obstacle to contracting for exact capital
efficiency.As a general matter, the information available to
the firm at investment time, indexed by u, may convey more than
justthe level of demand. If so,the prohibition of
contingencies on u may make it impossible to frame a contract to
achieve exact capital efficiency.But if u conveys pure scale
effects, then, asI will demonstrate shortly, contracts are
available in which efficiency does not require contingencies on
u The following assumptions are sufficient conditions for a
capital efficient contract not contingent on u:
Assumptions:
(A) The demand shifts, xi, are scale effects in the sense
that Vt (qi ,x1) is homogeneous o-f first degree in qa and Xi.
(B) The preliminary information, u, conveys the scale of
the Xj in the sense that the conditional distribution of x.
given u has density ga Xj/U)/U.
12(C)The revenue -Formula R(Q,K,w,r) is homogeneous ofdegree
one in Q and K.
It will turn out to be reasonable to consider contractsin
which the quantity choices of the purchasers influencethe
producer's revenue only through total quantity and notthrough
the vector o-f quantities chosen separately by eachpurchaser. In
this case, the revenue of the producer is a functionR(Q,K,w,r).
The producer chooses K to maximize expectedprofit,
ECR(0 (K,w,r ,x ),K,w,r) —C(Q,K,w) —rK]
HereI have noted that 0 depends on the producer's choice ofK
because K affects marginal cost, which inturn affects the
efficientlevel ofoutput. The marginal conditions for a maximum
ofprofit are
•:'RcQ,R CàQ C - EL— +- -— ri = ,0 I..K.•Q K.
Recall that investment efficiencyrequires E[— — r)=0,so the
contractsmust satisfy
13Theorem 3.A contract with revenue formula R(Q.K,w,r)
provides capital efficiency only if
— + = 0
30 oQ aK. Ic:
Cx :u)
Further, if a fOrmula satisfies this condition for u=1 and
all w and r, it satisfies it for all u, w, and r.
This theorem provides a criterion for a capital—efficient revenue
formula. Its three terms net to zero in order for the formula to
provide the right incentives for capital efficiency.The first
two arise because changes in the capital stock change the level
of output.The first term is the extra revenue the formula
provides for the extra output.The second is the extra cost
incurred in producing the output.The third term is the extra
revenue the formula may provide for the extra capital.If, for
example, the formula provides less compensation for the extra
output than its marginal cost, then it must provide an offsetting
amount of direct compensation for the capital itself.
The property that a formula achieving capital efficiency at
u=lalso achieves itfor any value of u means that the formula
neednotbe contingent on the value of u, which we assume is not
publicknowledge.
14Theinefficiency of marginal—cost pricing can now be
demonstrated. With marginal—cost pricing, the contractspecifies
a price,
.,C p(Ic,w,x) =
whichis marginal cost. Then revenue is price timesquantity,
R(Q,K,w,r) =p(K,w,x)O
The derivative of revenue with respect tooutput is just the
price, which equals marginal cost. Therefore the first two terms
in the criterion for capital efficiency cancel eachother. All
that is left is the third term, the derivative ofrevenue with
respect to the capital stock.This must equal zero for capital
efficiency. However, with marginal—cost pricing, that derivative
is which is negative, not zero. The larger is the capital
stock, the lower is the price——more capital lowersmarginal cost.
Profit maximization cannot bring the firm to theefficient stock.
This conclusion is summarized in
Theorem 4. Under marginal—cost pricing,expected profit is
a strictly decreasing function of the capitalstock, at the
efficient capital stock.
15Besides marginal—cost pricing, two other simple revenue
functions deserve mention because they are inefficient.One is
to let revenue equal cost
JRtQ,I<,w,r) = C(O,K,w) ÷ rf<
Thisrevenuefunction satisfies the marginal conditions for
capital efficiency but not the second order conditions. The
producer has profit of zero no matter what, and so is indifferent
among all levels of K. the purchasers would have to develop some
method outside the revenue function to steer the producer to the
efficient capital stock.
Another choice is to make revenue independent of either
output or capital- At first, this seems like the right approach.
The two parties want the producer to pick the efficient capital
stock so as to minimize the expected cost of producing whatever
level of output the purchasers decide to take. Maximizing profit
might then seem to be equivalent to minimizing cost.But the
firm influences the level of output through its choice of the
capital stock, even though the purchasers have the unilateral




aQ oQK oK OQ oI<
whichis unambiguously negative. The firm faces an inappropriate
disincentive to invest because it is not rewarded for the costof
producing the extra output stimulated by extra capital.
Though none of the three revenue formulas considered so far
provides the right investment incentives, the marginal condition
for capital efficiency is not actually very restrictive.Many
combinations of rewards for the extra oL(tput associated with
R Q extra capital,
t;.,anddirect rewards for investment,t,add
&c oQ up to offset the investment disincentive, .Ifthe
conditions imposed on the revenue formula by outputefficiency
are not too restrictive, capital efficiency is relativelyeasy to
achieve.
A particularly interesting and simpleway to provide the
firm with the right incentives is to makerevenue a fixed amount,
D (w,r) ,perunit of output. Then
R'Q,K,w,r) =Qt(w,r)
This formula provides no direct reward forinvestment but can
achieve efficiency by providing sufficientlystrong compensation
for output. The marginal condition is
•'Rf'C Q R - ELc
— U
17or
EE($ — = 0
oQ oK
Define the random variable z as
4Q e*Q z=
aK. oK.
z is a weight in the sense that its expected value is one. Then
the marginal condition can be written as
$(w,r) =E(z-a)
The efficient amount of revenue per unit of output is the
weighted expectation of marginal cost.Roughly speaking, unit
revenue should be long—run average cost.The roughness comes
from the treatment of uncertainty——the weighted average of
marginal cost takes exact account of the cost of meeting the
producer's commitment to meet variable demand.If the notion of
long—run average cost is modified to take account o-f the cost of
the variability, then the principle of setting short—run unit
revenue equal to long—run unit cost is an appropriate one. In
the related context of peak—load pricing. Boiteux (1949) showed
that the average marginal cost should equai long—run unit cost.
The problem faced by the designers of contracts (or by the
regulator) is to find a way to give the producer long—run
marginal cost while at the same time charging the buyers short—
18run marginal cost.When there are many buyers, a contract form
with precisely the right characteristics isavailable, as the
next section will show.
4. Contracts to provide both output and capitalefficiency
The type of contract considered in thispaper is most at
home when one producer sells to many buyers.When the buyers
have the unilateral power to determine thequantities they take,
the producer need not be concerned with the circumstancesof each
of the many purchasers.Instead, the producer should offer a
standardized contract to each buyer.This section shows that
such contracts can provide both output andcapital efficiency.
Key to the functioning of the contracts is the notion thateach
buyer is small enough so that its purchases do notaffect
marginal cost. Efficiency is approximate in exactly thesame way
that the efficiency of competitive equilibrium isapproximate—---
participants are unaware of their small amount ofmonopsony
power. The standardized contract studied here has the form
Rt(qs,Q,K,w,r' = Aq1,Q,K,w,r) + ssBQ,K.w,r)
with A C',ü,K,w,r) = C'.
Differences among customers arecaptured by the quantity they
purchase, q ,and a scale variable, sj; in all otherrespects,
19al 1 customers have the same contract -The scale var jab 1 essumto
unity:Es, =1..Linearity in the s means that the producer's
revenue is independent of the 5j The approximate concept of
output efficiency is expressed in
Definition.A contract is output—efficient for a small
purchaser if
A(q,Q,K,w,r) =qt
That is, the purchaser pays marginal cost for q1, but the
role of qi in total output, Q, is ignored.
This definition saves some tedious arguments later, none of
which is a departure from the same development of the efficiency
of competitive equilibrium.
Output efficiency restricts the form of the standardized
contract:
Theorem 5.A standardized contract is output—efficient for




R is an unrestricted function.
20Output efficiency requires that the payment made by a single
purchaser be a linear function of the quantity purchased.The
coefficient ofqi must be marginal cost. Again, output
efficiency calls for marginal—cost pricing..
In the standardized contract,each purchaser makes a
payment, ssR(Q,K,w,r), independent of the quantity it purchases.
It makes a further payment to the extent its purchase, qj
exceeds its prescribed share of total output, 5j0.Output
efficiency requires that the payment for the extra output be at
marginal cost, and also that the purchaser earn a reward at
marginal cost for taking less than its share.
So much for output efficiency.Capital efficiency involves
thetotal revenue of the producer,
:[qj — +sRJ= R(Q,K.w,r. -
Thus,the standardized contract imposes no restrictions at all on
the revenue received by the producer. Any function, R,
satisfying the criterion for capital efficiency,
'R cC, :0 L'R - — )+ —3 =u 0:L
canbe inserted into the standardizea contract to make it
simultaneously output— and capital—efficient.
21How does the standardized contract for multiple purchasers
accomplish its goal?In effect, charging a purchaser only for
the departure of its purchase from its share of total output
makes the N—i other purchasers function as a third party to the
contract between the purchaser and the seller.When demand is
strong, customers face high prices in the allocational sense, but
the revenue from those high prices flows to the customers as a
group, not to the producer. In this way, the producer does not
face the incentive to create chronic shortages by investing in
too little capital.Lorne Carmichael (1983) has suggested a
parallel contract in the labor market, where the other employees
in a firm function as the third party in the contract between the
firm and one employee. The potential role of third parties in
efficientcontracts has been explored extensively inthe
literature on incentive compatibility; see Green and Laffont
(1977) for a general discussion.
As section 3 of the paper concluded, many different revenue
formulas R(Q,K,w,r) can assure capital efficiency.But constant
unit revenue,
R(Q,K,w,r) =G!t(w,r)
is a natural and realistic choice. The standardized contract
becomes(qa — +saQf(w,r)
In words, the purchaser and the producer agree on a normal share
of total output. If the purchaser elects to take exactly its
normal share, it pays long—run unit cost.Departures from the
normal share are priced at current marginal cost. Total revenue
from all customers is long—run unit cost times output, and is
independent of the capital stock.
Iam unaware of any practical examples of contracts with
exactly these provisions, though Iwould be grateful for
suggestions from readers on this point.Formal contingencies on
realized marginal cost are tricky, because customersmay not be
able to verify capacity utilization rates. It seems to me that
the basic lesson from this investigation is the importance of
stabilizing the revenue of the firm in the appropriate way
against tight conditions.The customer must be assured that the
firm cant profit by underinvesting.The allocation of output
when demand is strong is a subsidiary issue, and not necessarily
one that must be handled by explicit marginal—cost pricing.As
Dennis Carlton (1978) has noted, suppliers in intermediate—
product markets are often deeply involved in deciding UPOflthe
quantityof outputto be delivered.Output is allocated among
customerE when supplies are short, not soid to the highest
bidder.
Stabilizingunit revenue is not the only way to provide theright investment incentives to the firm.Total revenue could be
made independent of the level of output and positively related to
the amount of capital. But then the "price"——unit revenue of the
firm——would be negatively related to output. Though the evidence
strongly favors stable unit revenue over marginal cost, it does
not go so far as to suggest declining unit revenue in good times.
To put it another way, profits do decline in recessions, though
not by as much as theywould with marginal—cost pricing.
245. Macroeconomic implications and conclusions
If contracts achieve output efficiency, then the price
rigiditytheyinduce is not a direct sourceofmacro
disequilibrium. In effect, output efficiency says the level of
output is at the intersection of the implicit supply and demand
curves for output.In this respect, the study of contracts in
product markets reaches the same conclusion as the closely
related study of contracts in labor markets——there are good
reasons -for the parties to stabilize the flow of payments from
one party to the other, but no reason to expect disequilibrium or
inefficiency just because the flow is stabilized.There is
little doubt that disequilibrium is a major feature of the
economy, but no reason to think that the price and wage rigidity
associated with long—term contracts is a direct contributor to
disequilibrium.
It is probably reasonable to interpret most government price
indexes as measures of the unit revenue of producers.If so, the
revenue stabilization property of a contract that yields capital
efficiency has important implications about the information
conveyed by the price indexes.In general. unit revenue cannot
be an indicator of marginal cost or of the relation between
outpLlt and capital. In particular, if unit revenue is typically
held perfectly stable, relative to input costs, then price
indexes are deprived of much of their value in signalling the
25current state of the economy.
If prices tracked marginal cost,and so fell during
recessions and rose during booms, they would convey information
in a highly usable way to agents elsewhere in the economy.For
example, labor contracts are often contingent on prices, but the
unresponsiveness of prices over the business cycle prevents the
contingency from offsetting the parallel shifts in the demand for
labor.Employment fluctuations might well be smaller (and more
efficient) if prices were closer to marginal cost..In this
respect, the need to stabilize revenue to provide the correct
incentives for investcent may indirectly contribute to macro
disequilibrium as a byproduct.
Even in product markets, the stabilization of unit revenue
in a transaction at an early stage of production may introduce
problems at later stages.If the published price of a raw
material is actually stabilized unit revenue, then the contract
between a producer of a product for which the raw material is an
input and a downstream purchaser cannot be made appropriately
contingent on marginal cost.
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28Appendix. Proofs of theorems.
Theorems 1 and 2 follow immediately fromtheassumptions a-f
strict concavity, differentiability, and saturation.
Theorem 3.A contract with revenue formula R(Q,K,w,r) provides
capital efficiency only if
— + = 0 'Q ,Q cIc.,K Cx u}
Further, if a formula satisfies this condition for u=1 and all w
and r, it satisfies it for all u, w, and r.
Proof:
Thefirst—order condition -for maximum profit is
R &C Q R C - +'K
— — r]=0
(Xi u)
At the efficient capital stock,
E(—---— ri =0
IC. Cx :u
so,at the efficient stock with the first—order condition
satisfied as well,
•'R 'C eQ eR EL (—- —) -- + ---) = (_)- w Cr'.Cr (Xi u}
29Next, let 71beexpected profit:
n(K,u,w,r) = EER(Q.K,w,r)—C(q,K,w) — rK]
Thenextstep is to show that r is homogeneous of degree zero in
K and u, that is,
7T(K,u.w,r) =un(K/u,1,w,r)
Now,
r =SCR (0 (K,w,x ) ,K,w,r) —C(0 (K,w,x ,Ic:,w) —rK]g(x/u) /u du
Letx' = x/u.Then
=CR(0K,w,ux ) ,K,w,r) — C(0 (K,w,ux) ,K,w) — rK]g (x) dx
From thefirst—degree homogeneity of R in C! and K, and the first-
degree homogeneity of C in 0 and K,
=uJCR(0'K/u,w,x'),K:/u,w,r)—C(0(K/u,w,x ') ,K/u,w) — rK/u]g(x')dx
=urr(KIu,1,w,r)
as asserted.
The maximizing K plainly has the form
K(u,w,r) =uk(w,r) -
Thenthe zero—degree homogeneity of o/c'K implies that if it
equals zero at the efficient K for u1, it equals zero at the
efficient f:: for any value of u
30Theorem 4.Under marginal—cost pricing, expected profit is a
strictly decreasing function of the capital stock, at the
efficient capital stock.
Proof:
Let p be the marginal—cost price:
'C(Q(K,w,x),}<,w) p(Ic.,w,x)=
Thenexpected profit is
(I<:,u,w,r. =EEp(Kw,x) 0(K,w,x ) —C(0,K,w)— rK)
The derivative of expected profit with respect to K is
=EEQ:;+(p- -- r]










aCoQ÷oaC (*) oKo0K: 0aK
a2C From constant returns, > 0 and < 0. The next step is to
look at the sign of Foreach i, output efficiency requires
èVt(q (K,w,x) ,Xs)= p(K,w,x)
cqs
so
c2V = 92. qi2oK
Now < 0, so has the opposite sign of .Since
3K— K
- 9_a 9a> hasthe opposite sign of,.SupposeK
= Then--= (3,
andthe right hand side of(*) is strictly negative, a
contradiction. Therefore < 0..Finally, as a result, 0,
as asserted.
32Theorem 5.A standardized contract is output—efficient for a
small purchaser if and only if it can be written in the form
Atq ,Q,K,w,r)+ ssB(Q,K,w,r) =
(qs— + sR(O,IcZ,w,r)
Ris an unrestricted function.
Proof:
• • • oA aC I.Sufficiency is obvious: -——=
II.Necessity:




Integrateover qj to get
A(q,Q,K,w,r) =qs-
The constant of integration is zero because the standardized
contract requires A(O,Q,K,w,r) =0. Thus the output—efficient
contract has the form,
÷ ssBQ.K,w,r)
LetR(O.,K,w,r) = B(Q,K,w,r) +
Then
+ sB(Q,K,w,r) =
qs- s1LR(O,K,w,r) — =
(qs — + sR(O,K,w,r)
as asserted.
34